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Fairness Is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Conflicting
Interpretations of the Correct Measure of Damages for
Breaches of Natural Gas Contracts Containing Take-OrPay Provisions*
I. INTRODUCTION

Contracts between the producers of natural gas and the pipeline
buyers that transport the gas to consumers often contain "take-or-pay"
provisions. 1 Typically, these provisions require the buyer of the gas to
either purchase at least a contractually specified minimum volume of
gas at a price that is fixed by the contract, or to pay for that same
minimum volume without taking physical possession of it. 2 However, if
the buyer pays for the gas without taking it, the buyer retains the right
to take the prepaid quantity of gas in the future. 3 The seller is contractually bound to deliver at least the specified minimum quantity of gas
and is entitled to receive the contractually fixed rate for all of the gas
that is taken by the pipeline. 4
When buyers breach a contract that includes a take-or-pay provision, courts have a difficult time determining the correct measure of
damages. This difficulty is illustrated by the different interpretations of
the correct method for calculating damages that have been given by
various courts. The difficulty in calculating the damages arises because
some courts construe the take-or-pay clause as a strict contractual performance requirement that entitles the non-breaching party to the total
amount of the payments due under the contract. 5 Other courts6 assert

Copyright <r> 1999 by Rodrick J. Coffey.
1. See John Burritt McArthur, The Take-Or-Pay Crisis, 22 N.M. L. REv. 353, 354
(1992).
2. See 4 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 724.5
(1998).
3. Contracts generally limit the amount of time that the buyer has to take the prepaid gas.
See id. at 662.
4. See id. at 659. Take-or-pay provisions usually consist of the following language:
"Seller agrees to sell and deliver to [Buyer] and [Buyer] agrees to purchase and receive from
Seller, or if available and not taken, pay for that quantity of pipeline gas .... "!d. at 661.
5. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 1236-37 (Colo.
1993).
6. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 689 (lOth Cir.
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that the take-or-pay clause is merely a statement of alternative contractual duties which, if breached, entitle the seller to the "difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid
contract price together with any incidental damages." The latter is the
remedy prescribed by Section 2-708 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). 7 An alternative interpretation of the take-or-pay clause that is
rejected by both the majority and minority8 would be that the take-orpay clause is the equivalent of a liquidated damages provision. 9
The Colorado Supreme Court held in Colorado Interstate Gas
Company, Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., that the breach of a contract containing
a take-or-pay provision entitles the non-breaching party to the full
amount of the take-or-pay payments due. 10 This rule is not supported by
other state and federal courts. 11 However, the Colorado rule seems to
be the most reasonable interpretation of the take-or-pay provisions in
contracts and accordingly provides the correct measure of damages to
the seller when the buyer breaches. The Colorado rule is supported by
the clear and unambiguous language of most take-or-pay provisions; it
maintains the contracting parties' allocation of risk, and it deters future
breaches by buyers.
Part of the reason that courts have struggled with the issue of determining the proper measure of damages when buyers breach take-orpay contracts is that it is a relatively new issue with little case law for
courts to base their holdings upon. The lack of precedent has caused
some disagreement between courts, all of which rely heavily on treatises rather than primary sources of the law to aid them in their decisions. 12 Because this is a relatively new issue that deals with the UCC,

1991); Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987);
Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
7. u.c.c. § 2-708 (1997).
8. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Colo. 1993); Roye Realty &
Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
9. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997).
10. 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993).
11. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 689 (lOth Cir.
1991); Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987);
Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
12. This point is further illustrated by the fact that all of the cases dealing with the issue of
calculating the damages when buyers breach contracts containing take-or-pay provisions cited in
this Note refer to Corbin on Contracts as their principle source of authority on the issue. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 689 (lOth Cir. 1991); Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Colorado Interstate Gas
Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.,
863 P.2d 1150 (Okl. 1993).
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it is important that courts develop a uniform rule that is based on careful consideration of all of the ramifications surrounding the various interpretations thereof. All states should establish a uniform rule so that
there is predictability and uniform application of contract law and
remedies throughout the United States.
This Note will examine the issue of determining the correct calculation of damages that should be awarded to sellers when buyers breach
a contract that contains a take-or-pay clause. Part II of this Note discusses the background of this issue, including the applicable provisions
of the UCC, and how other state and federal courts have ruled in similar cases that conflict with Chemco. Part III examines the facts and the
Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning in Chemco. Part IV analyzes
Chemco, compares it to the holdings of other courts in similar cases,
and concludes that the Colorado interpretation of take-or-pay provisions
is the best rule and, as such, prescribes the correct amount of damages
that the seller should be awarded if the buyer breaches. 13
II. BACKGROUND

A. Reasons for Including Take-or-Pay Provisions in Contracts
Parties to a contract whereby a producer sells natural gas to a pipeline buyer often include take-or-pay provisions in the contract. 14 One of
the primary reasons that parties include take-or-pay provisions in such
contracts is to allocate the risk of market price fluctuations. 15 When the
price for gas is set by the contract, the seller bears all of the risk because if the market price increases before the contract expires, the
seller is bound to sell the gas to the buyer at the contractually agreed
upon rate regardless of the higher market price. Thus, the buyer is
guaranteed a fixed rate for the duration of the contract while the seller
may be forced to sell the gas at a rate that is far below the market price.
In the absence of a take-or-pay provision, a buyer can refuse to
purchase any gas if its resale becomes unprofitable due to a decline in
the market price that puts the market price below the contract price.
This places all of the risk on the seller. As a result, sellers can never
get more than the market price, at the time that the contract is signed,
13. But cf. A.F. Brooke, Note, Great Expectations: Assessing the Contract Damages of the
Take-or-Pay Producer, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1469, 1478 (1992); Ryan E. Griffitts, Comment, Roye
Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.: Two Steps Forward and Two Steps Back in the Take-orPay Saga, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 219, 234-35 (1996).
14. See John Burritt McArthur, The Take-Or-Pay Crisis, 22 N.M. L. REv. 353, 354
(1992).

15. See id. at 359.
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for their gas, while the buyers who resell the gas may gain significant
profits therefrom if the market price rises significantly higher than the
contract price. The take-or-pay provision insures that even if the market
price of gas drops below the contract price, the buyer will still have to
pay the seller for a minimum quantity of gas at the contract price regardless of whether the buyer takes the gas and resells it. 16 This provision has the effect of allocating the risk of fluctuations in the market
price between the buyer and seller, rather than forcing the seller to bear
all of the risk. 17 Thus, in a sense, contracts for the sale of gas that include take-or-pay provisions are analogous to futures markets, in that
both parties bear some risk of loss due to fluctuations in the market
price.
Take-or-pay provisions became prominent in the late 1970s when
Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978, 18 which
was intended to stabilize the price of natural gas. 19 Because the price of
natural gas was fixed by government regulation, the pipeline buyers lost
a lot of their previously superior bargaining power0 and were forced to
submit to take-or-pay provisions in order to contract with the gas selling producers. 21 These take-or-pay provisions as well as the statutorily
fixed prices for natural gas provided a great deal of certainty and stability for the natural gas market. 22 However, in the mid-1980's, the
natural gas industry was deregulated, and gas prices fell substantially,
frequently far below the take-or-pay contract prices. 23 Because of the
decline in the market price for gas, many pipelines found it unprofitable
to resell the gas that they were contractually obligated to pay for (regardless of whether they took it). This induced many pipeline buyers to
breach their contracts with the producer sellers by not paying the sellers.24 Many of those breaches were litigated and the courts were called

16. Under most contracts with take-or-pay provisions, if the buyer does not take the gas at
the time of the payment, it may treat the payment as a prepayment for gas that it will take in the
future in excess of the contractually fixed minimum. Thus, if it pays for the minimum gas in
month 1, but does not take the gas, it may pay for the minimum quantity in month 2 and take
twice the minimum monthly quantity of gas because it has prepaid for one month. Contracts generally limit the duration of time that the buyer has to take the prepaid gas. See id. at 358-59.
17. Seeid.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1998).
19. See Griffitts, supra note 13, at 222.
20. Some commentators have referred to pipelines in the pre-NPGA times as monopolies
with substantial bargaining power which was weakened by the passage of the NGPA. See
McArthur, supra note 1, at 355.
21. See Griffitts, supra note 13, at 223.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 223-24.
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upon to establish a remedy. 25 Although not as frequent as in the mid1980's, pipeline buyers of natural gas continue to breach their contracts
containing take-or-pay provisions with producer sellers. 26
Courts examining these types of contracts have generally upheld the
validity of take-or-pay provisions. 27 Defendant buyers, who have
breached their contracts, normally raise several affirmative defenses28
but are typically unsuccessful. 29 The court's attention is therefore focused on a determination of the correct measure of damages for buyer's
breach of the take-or-pay provision.
B. UCC Provisions Covering the Remedy for Breach of a Contract
Containing a Take-or-Pay Provision

Article 2 of the UCC, which has been adopted in every state but
Louisiana, 30 governs the sale of natural gas. 31 While one might assume
25. This Note contends that similar breaches continue to occur because the courts have established a remedy that is favorable to the breaching pipelines, i.e. the remedy allows them to
breach their contracts without paying the amount that they are contractually obligated to pay. This
type of remedy has essentially eliminated the risk allocation to the pipelines.
26. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993);
Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arlda, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
27. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc. 854 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Colo. 1993); Roye Realty & Dev.,
Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993). See also 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2,
at § 724.5 (citing Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Republic Natural Gas Co., 241 P.2d 708 (Kan.
1952)).
28. Among those defenses that have generally failed are mutual mistake, unconscionability,
commercial impracticability, and conservation. See McArthur, supra note 1, at 366; J. Michael
Medina, The Take-or-Pay Wars: A Cautionary Analysis for the Future, 27 TULSA L.J. 283, 293312 (1991); J. Michael Medina et al., Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Takeor-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 210-252 (1987).
29. See McArthur, supra note 1, at 365; J. Michael Medina, The Take-or-Pay Wars: A
Cautionary Analysis for the Future, 27 TULSA L.J. 283, 293-312 (1991); J. Michael Medina et al.,
Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 210-252 (1987).
30. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-1-102, 7-2-708, 7-2-718, 7-2-719; ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.01.102,
45.02.708, 45.02.718, 45.02.719; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1102, 47-2708, 47-2718, 472719; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-102, 4-2-708, 4-2-718, 4-2-719; CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1102,
2708, 2718, 2719; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 4-1-102, 4-2-708, 4-2-718, 4-2-719; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 42A-1-102, 42A-2-708, 42A-2-718, 42A-2-719; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2718, 2-719; FLA. STAT.§§ 671.102, 672.708, 672.718, 672.719; GA. CODE ANN.§§ 11-1-102,
11-2-708, 11-2-718, 11-2-719; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 490:1-102, 490:2-708, 490:2-718, 409:2719; IDAHO CODE§§ 28-1-102, 28-2-708, 28-2-718, 28-2-719; 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102,
5/2-708, 512-718, 512-719; IND. CODE§§ 26-1-1-102, 26-1-2-708, 26-1-2-718, 26-1-2-719; IOWA
CODE§§ 554.1102, 554.2708, 554.2718, 554.2719; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1-102, 84-2-708,
84-2-718, 84-2-719; KY. REV. STAT.§§ 355.1-102, 355.2-708, 355.2-718, 355.2-719; ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2-719; MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW§§ 1-102, 2708, 2-718, 2-719; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2-719; MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.1102, 19.2708, 19.2718, 19.2719; MINN. STAT. §§ 336.1-102, 336.2-708, 336.2718, 336.2-719; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-102, 75-2-708, 75-2-718, 75-2-719; MO. REV. STAT.
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that the universal adoption of the UCC would seem to eliminate confusion among courts as to the proper remedy for the breach of a contract
containing a take-or-pay provision, there are different provisions within
the UCC that lend support to conflicting interpretations of the correct
measure of damages for the breach of such a contract. 32 Section 2-708
of the UCC states that a seller's damages for non-acceptance of goods
(gas) or repudiation of contractual obligations by the buyer "is the difference between the market price at the time and place of tender and the
unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages . . . but less
expenses in consequence of the buyer's breach. " 33 Thus, if the buyer
breaches, the seller retains ownership of the gas that the buyer failed to
pay for, and the buyer pays the difference between the contract price
and the market price to the seller. 34 The majority of courts deciding this
issue have stated that Section 2-708 of the UCC governs, and calculate
damages according to the formula supplied thereby. 35
Other sections of the UCC allow contracting parties to vary the
provisions of the UCC by contrad6 and to provide remedies for
breaches of contracts that are either supplementary to or in lieu of those
§§ 400.1-102, 400.2-708, 400.2-718, 400.2-719; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-102, 30-2-708, 302-718, 30-2-719; NEB. UCC §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2-719; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 104.1102,
104.2708, 104.2718, 104.2719; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:1-102, 382-A:2-708, 382-A:2718, 32-A:2-719; N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:1-102, 12A:2-708, 12A:2-718, 12A:2-719;
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§55-1-102, 55-2-708, 55-2-718, 55-2-719; N.Y. UCC LAW§§ 1-102, 2-708,
2-718, 2-719; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-102, 25-2-708, 25-2-718, 25-2-719; N.D. CENT. CODE§
41-02-87; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.82; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2719; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 71.1020, 72.7080 72.7180, 72.7190; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102,
2708, 2718, 2719; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6A-1-102, 6A-2-708, 6A-2-718, 6A-2-719; S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-1-102, 36-2-708, 36-2-718, 36-2-719; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 57A-1-102,
57A-2-708, 57A-2-718, 52A-2-719; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-102, 47-2-708, 47-2-218, 47-2219; TEX BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.102, 2.708, 2.718, 2.719; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-1102, 70A-2-708, 70A-2-718, 70A-2-719; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A §§ 1-102,2-708,2-718, 2-719;
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1-102, 8.2-708, 8.2-718, 8.2-719; WASH. REV. CODE§§ 62A.1-102,
62A.2-708, 62A.2-718, 62A.2-719; W.VA. CODE§§ 46-1-102, 46-2-708, 46-2-718, 46-2-719;
WIS. STAT. §§ 401.102, 402.708, 402.718, 402.719; WYO. STAT. §§ 34.1-1-102, 34.1-2-708,
34.1-2-718, 34.1-2-719. All of these references are to the sections of the UCC that are relevant to
this Note. Sections 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2-719 of the UCC have been adopted in each state, except Louisiana, without any variation from the actual UCC provision. !d.
31. See Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77, 78 (5th
Cir. 1987); Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236; Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150,
1153 (Okla. 1993).
32. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102, 2-708, 2-718, 2-719 (1997).
33. u.c.c. § 2-708 (1997).
34. Typically when the buyer breaches, the contract price will exceed the market price.
Otherwise, the buyer would simply purchase the gas and then resell it at a profit, or assign the
rights thereto.
35. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
36. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1997).
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prescribed by any specific section of the UCC. 37 Thus, the very terms
of a contract can supply the remedy for a breach thereof. Take-or-pay
provisions have been interpreted as providing a remedy for breach of
contract in lieu of Section 2-708 of the UCC. 38 Under that interpretation, if the buyer breaches a contract that includes a take-or-pay provision, the seller retains ownership of the gas and the buyer pays the full
amount of the remaining take-or -pay payments at the contract price. 39
This is the remedy established by the Colorado Supreme Court in
Chemco under the rationale that the take-or-pay clause established a
contractual duty and that the damages for a breach thereof were the total amount of payments due under the contract. 40 However, other courts
have interpreted the take-or-pay clause as an alternative method of performance option that is breached if the buyer does not make the takeor-pay payments. Under this rationale the proper remedy is the difference between the contract and market prices. 41 Section 2-718 of the
UCC provides that "[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. " 42 However, thus far, courts
have refused to interpret take-or-pay provisions as the equivalent of liquidated damages. 43
One of the reasons why every state adopted the UCC was to provide uniformity in the legal treatment of contracts. 44 Uniformity allows
entities to conducr business with informed confidence about the legal
ramifications of their actions. This lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the proper remedy for breach of contracts containing take-or-pay
clauses should be rectified by the establishment of a clear rule. While
either the majority rule or the Chemco rule will provide that uniformity,
37. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (1997).
38. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Colo.
1993).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1987); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
42. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997). However, both the majority and the minority of courts that
have dealt with this issue have rejected the notion that take-or-pay clauses constitute liquidated
damage provisions. See Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77
(5th Cir. 1987); Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc. 854 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Colo.
1993); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
43. See Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1987); Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc. 854 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Colo. 1993);
Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
44. See U.C.C. § 1-101 (1997).
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the Chemco rule preserves the true meaning of the take-or-pay provision, maintains the contracting parties' allocation of risk, and acts as a
deterrent against the breaching of contracts.
III. COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS COMPANY, INC. V. CHEMCO, INC.

A. Facts
In 1978, Chemco entered into a lease on oil and gas acreage in
Colorado whereby it was permitted to drill for natural gas. 45 The following year, Chemco entered into a fifteen-year contract containing a
take-or-pay provision with Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG),
which installed and operated gas collecting facilities on the Chemco
well. " 46 Furthermore, the contract provided that "[d]uring the 5 years
next succeeding the Contract Year in which Buyer has failed to take the
gas so paid for, all gas well gas taken by Buyer from Seller which is in
excess of the gas well Contract Quantity of gas for the current Contract
Year ... shall be delivered without charge to Buyer until such excess
equals the amount of gas previously paid for but not taken. " 47
In 1985, CIG attempted to renegotiate the terms of the agreement
when the market price of natural gas began to fall. 48 As a result of
Chemco's refusal to renegotiate the contract price, CIG stopped making
its periodic payments to Chemco and unsuccessfully sought declaratory
relief, claiming that it had a right under the contract to discontinue
taking the gas. 49 Chemco countersued for damages, claiming inter alia
that CIG had breached its obligations under the take-or-pay clause. 5°
The trial court determined that there was a take-or-pay provision in
the contract and that if the jury found that CIG had breached the contract, the damages should be all of the take-or-pay payments that were
due under the contract. 51 The jury found that CIG had breached the
contract and awarded damages to Chemco pursuant to the court's directions.52 CIG then appealed the trial court's holding to the Colorado
45. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d 786, 788 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992).
46. /d. at 790-91.
47. /d. at 791.
48. CIG specifically wanted to alter the contract price for the natural gas. See id at 788.
49. The provision of the contract upon which CIG based its claim provided that the buyer
could elect to discontinue taking gas if the quantity delivered by the well became so low that it was
no longer economically feasible for the buyer to take the gas. However, this claim was rejected by
the court. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id at 791.
52. See id at 788.
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Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by not instructing
the jury on the proper measure of damages. 53 The Colorado Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's verdict and supported the trial court's
instructions to the jury on the calculation of damages. 54 On a subsequent appeal by CIG, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the holding
of the trial court. 55

B. The Court's Reasoning
In its appeal, CIG asserted that because a contract containing a
take-or-pay clause is one of alternative performances, the correct measure of damages for the breach thereof was given by section 2-708 of the
UCC. 56 The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with this assertion and
held that, "the remedy for breach of the alternative performance obligation is the payment of damages equivalent to the value of the remaining performance obligation. " 57 Thus, CIG was required to pay the
full amount of the payments that it was contractually obligated to pay
Chemco under the contract.
The court stated that, while the UCC governed the sale of natural
gas, section 2-708 was not the only relevant section of the UCC with
respect to the contract between Chemco and CIG. 58 Specifically, section
1-102 of the UCC allows parties to vary provisions of the UCC by
agreement, 59 and section 2-719 provides that parties "'may provide for
remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided' by the
UCC. "' 60 Furthermore, section 2-718 of the UCC provides that parties
may establish liquidated damages for breach of the contract as long as
the damages are reasonable. 61 Because the other provisions of the UCC
were also relevant to the contract, the court asserted that "the agreement creates a performance obligation with a concomitant remedy for
its breach. "62 Thus, the court determined that the parties had agreed to
provide for a remedy in substitution of the governing UCC remedies by
including a take-or-pay provision in their contract. 63 The court determined that the remedy for a breach by the buyer was that which was
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id at 790.
See id. at 792.
See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1240.
See id. at 1236.
/d.
See id.
See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1997).
Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236 (quoting U.C.C. §2-719(l)(a) (1997)).
See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997).
Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236.
See id.
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provided by the contract: the full amount of payments due under the
take-or-pay provision. 64
The court supported its holding by arguing that a take-or-pay provision is a means by which some risk can be allocated to the buyer, and
that allowing the buyer to avoid its obligations under the contract undermines the allocation of risk made by the parties. 65 The risk to the
buyer is that if the market price of natural gas falls, the buyer is nevertheless obligated to pay the seller the contract price regardless of
whether the buyer takes the gas. Thus, when the buyer enters into the
contract, it takes the risk that the market price may fall with the knowledge that, in that event, it will still have to pay for the minimum quantity of gas. The allocation of risk is one of the factors typically considered by contracting parties when they negotiate the terms of their
contract. 66 The Colorado Supreme Court stated that if a court allows a
buyer to breach a contract containing a take-or-pay provision without
requiring the buyer to pay the contractually required amount, the court
has in effect rewritten the contract by "reallocating the risk in a way
not intended by the parties. " 67
Furthermore, the court argued that because the seller is a lost volume seller, "the payments made pursuant to a take-or-pay provision are
not payments for the sale of gas," but rather payments for an option to
take the gas for a limited period of time in the future, and therefore, the
buyer is not entitled to a reduction of the total amount of payments due
under the contract based on the difference between the market price for
the gas and the contract price. 68 However, the court rejected the notion
that take-or-pay clauses are the equivalent of liquidated damage provisions. 69 The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the alternative is a performance obligation, it is distinguishable from the payment provisions of a
liquidated damages remedy. " 70

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id at 1236-37.
See 6 LINDON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1354, at 458 (1962).
Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237.
See id.
See id.
/d.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Plain Words of Contract Establish Buyer's Duties
The plain words of the contract between Chemco and CIG clearly
establish each party's duties and obligations under the contract. The
take-or-pay provision of the contract states that CIG must pay Chemco
for a minimum quantity of gas regardless of whether it actually takes
the gas. 71 While CIG could subsequently take the prepaid gas any time
within five years after having paid for it, CIG forfeited its rights by
failing to do so. 72 Thus, as with any take-or-pay contract, CIG as the
buyer was bound by the express terms of the contract to pay for the
minimum quantity of gas regardless of whether it took the gas. 73 Failure
to make such payments constituted a breach of contract.
Typically under the UCC, when a buyer breaches a contract for the
sale of goods, the seller's damages are the difference between the market price and the unpaid contract price in addition to incidental damages.74 However, as the court in Chemco correctly asserted, "the payments made pursuant to a take-or-pay provision are not payments for
the sale of gas. " 75 Instead, those payments should be properly categorized as simply one of two alternative contract performance options. 76
Because it is possible under the contract that CIG could pay for the gas
and never actually receive it, the contract was not necessarily a contract
for the sale of goods. Therefore, Section 2-708 of the UCC does not
provide the appropriate remedy. CIG had two alternative methods by
which it could fulfill its obligation under the contract: it could take the
minimum quantity of gas and pay for it, or it could simply pay without
taking the gas. 77 As the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "[o]nce the
"take-or-pay" alternative expired with the passage of time-the contract
year-the damages are no longer measured by the value of that method
of performance [taking and paying for the gas] even if that alternative
71. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d 786, 790-91 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1992).
72. See id. at 791.
73. See 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at§ 724.5.
74. See U.C.C. § 2-708 (1997).
75. Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237. See also Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Tex. 1996); Marc Ryan Stimpert, Note, Lenape Resources
Corporation v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company: Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Contracts Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 ENERGY L. J. 421, 426 (1997) (citing Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1988)).
76. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237. See also 5 LINDON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1079, at 453-54 (1964).
77. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237.
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would yield a smaller recovery. "78 Instead, the court stated, "performance becomes the monetary payment of a sum unambiguously defined
by the contract. "79
The court asserted that because the inclusion of a take-or-pay provision satisfied the requirements of Sections 1-102 and 2-719 of the
UCC, it provided a remedy in substitution for those provided by other
sections of the UCC. 80 Therefore, the only proper remedy for a breach
by the buyer was that prescribed by the contract: full payment of all
outstanding take-or-pay payments. 81 Other courts have refused to define
take-or-pay provisions as "alternative remedies" that are enforceable
pursuant to UCC Sections 1-102 and 2-719. 82 In Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., a case that has very similar facts to
Chemco, 83 the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "there is no indication
in the take-or-pay provision of the contract that its terms are intended to
vary the effect of provisions of the UCC. " 84 Pursuant to UCC Section
2-708, the Oklahoma court awarded as damages the difference between
the market price and the contract price. 85 Thus, while Colorado is willing to construe a take-or-pay clause as providing for a remedy that is
supplementary to, or in lieu of, those provided by the UCC, Oklahoma
is reluctant to make such a determination absent an express statement in
the contract indicating the parties' intent to vary the remedies provided
by the UCC, despite the clear and unambiguous wording of the take-orpay provision. Other courts that have confronted the issue of calculating
damages for the breach of contracts containing take-or-pay provisions
have agreed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 86
Although Oklahoma has adopted Sections 1-102 and 2-719 of the
UCC, 87 the court refused to interpret the take-or-pay provision as a
supplementary provision for remedies other than those supplied by the

78. /d.
79. /d.
80. See id. at 1236. See also U.C.C. §§ 1-102, 2-719 (1997).
81. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236.
82. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Okla. 1993).
83. The contract obligations were virtually identical; Arkla, the buyer was required to either take and pay Roye Realty the seller for at least a minimum quantity of gas or, alternatively,
pay for the same quantity whether the gas was taken or not. When the market prices fell below the
contractually fixed price, Arkla breached. See Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1150.
84. Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Okla. 1993).
85. See id.
86. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 1-102, 2-719 (1998).
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UCC. 88 Additionally, the language of the court's opinion indicates that
even if such a provision was expressly stated as being supplementary
to, or in lieu of, those remedies supplied by other sections of the UCC,
the court would still ignore those provisions and use the remedy supplied by Section 2-708 of the UCC. The court asserted that the purpose
of Section 2-719 of the UCC was satisfied by awarding damages to the
seller in the amount of the difference between the contract and market
prices because the seller would receive the full contract price for the
gas. 89 However, this assertion is erroneous because the parties did not
contract for the full market price. The Oklahoma rule has the effect of
taking away some of the freedom that parties have to contract because it
rewrites the contract. It also eliminates the predictability and enforceability of remedies that contracting parties choose to provide in lieu of
those given by the UCC.
Because the payments made pursuant to take-or-pay provisions are
not necessarily for the sale of gas, 90 the Oklahoma rule distorts the purpose and the plain meaning of the take-or-pay provision and circumvents the intentions of both the contracting parties and Section 2-719 of
the UCC. By so doing, the court essentially rewrites the contract. Thus,
although Sections 1-102 and 2-719 of the UCC have been adopted in
Oklahoma, 91 the state supreme court has taken it upon itself to ignore a
provision in a contract that, pursuant to Sections 1-102 and 2-719 of the
UCC, provided for remedies other than those prescribed by the UCC.
In addition, the Oklahoma/majority rule ignores Section 2-719 of the
UCC and substitutes another remedy supplied by Section 2-708 of the
UCC. 92 If the payments made pursuant to take-or-pay provisions were
always for the purchase of gas, then the Oklahoma rule would be correct. However, because the sellers can sometimes receive take-or-pay
payments and never actually be required to deliver the minimum quantity of gas, the Oklahoma/majority rule does not put the seller in as
good of a position as it would have been in if the buyer had not
breached. For this reason, the Colorado rule is correct and preserves
the intentions of the contracting parties as well as the plain language of
their contract.
Buyers may argue that requiring full payment of the contract
amount is inappropriate because that is not the remedy used in other
common oil and gas industry contracts that contain alternative perform88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1156.
See id. at 1157.
See Chemco, 854 F.2d at 1237; Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1155.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 1-102, 2-719 (1998).
See Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1157-58.
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ance obligations similar in form to take-or-pay obligations. For example, the buyer's obligation is analogous to that of a lessee who pays
delay rentals in lieu of drilling for oil or gas. 93 However, such contracts
are distinguishable. The lessee can escape liability for failure to perform his obligations because the lease automatically terminates when
the lessee fails to drill or pay its delay rentals. However, the buyer in a
take-or-pay contract cannot escape such liability because the terms of
the contract do not provide the same option of automatic termination as
a result of failure to fulfill the contract. 94 Furthermore, there is nothing
in a take-or-pay provision that allows the buyer to terminate the contract by failing to fulfill his contractual obligations and then taking an
affirmative step to terminate the contract, as there is in contracts with
"or" leases. 95
Thus, while those two types of leases, which are very common in
the oil and gas industry ,96 provide alternative contract obligations, they
are clearly distinguishable from take-or-pay provisions for several reasons. First, they are leases of the rights to drill for oil and/or gas while
take-or-pay clauses are for the right to purchase gas that has already
been produced. 97 Second, the two types of leases provide for termination of the contract as the remedy for a breach thereof, 98 whereas takeor-pay provisions do not give the buyers that option. 99 Third, under a
lease it is in the non-breaching party's best interest to have the contract
terminate when the lessee fails to drill or pay rentals because the lessor
is then free to find another lessee who will actually drill for oil and/or
gas, which typically is more profitable to the lessor than the delay
rental payments. 100 In contrast, it is not in the best interest of the seller
of natural gas to allow the buyer to simply walk away from the contract
because generally the reason why the buyer breaches is that the market
price is below the contract price. In that situation, it will be difficult, if

93. Generally, delay rentals are consideration paid by a lessee to a lessor in exchange for
the right to postpone drilling operations. Typically, delay rental clauses allow the lessor to cancel a
lease when the lessee fails to pay-or-drill. See RICHARD C. MAXWELL ET AL., THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS 605 (6th ed. 1992). For a more in depth description of delay rentals, see 3 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 605.
94. With "unless leases," the lease automatically terminates unless the lessee either drillsor-pays the delay rentals by a date specified in the lease. See 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
2, at§ 606.
95. With "or leases," the lessee must pay the delay rentals, drill a well, or take an affirmative step to surrender the lease back to the lessor. See id. at § 607.
96. See id. at§§ 606-607.
97. See id. at §§ 605, 724.5.
98. See id. at§§ 606-607.
99. See id. at§ 724.5.
100. See id. at§ 605.
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not impossible, for the seller to find a new buyer that is willing to pay
the same price as the original buyer who has breached the contract. Because of these significant differences between take-or-pay contracts and
leases that also contain alternative performance provisions, the different
treatment of the two is clearly appropriate.
B. Chemco Preserves the Purpose ofthe Take-or-Pay Provision
It is generally accepted that the primary purpose of take-or-pay

provisions is to allocate risk between the buyer and seller of natural
gas. 101 The take-or-pay provision removes some of the risk from the
seller and places some of the risk on the buyer. 102 The seller risks that
the market price will exceed the contract price at some point during the
duration of the contract, and that it will be obligated to sell the gas at
the lower contract price. The buyer risks that the market price will fall
below the contract price at some point during the duration of the contract, and it will be obligated to either buy gas at a higher price than it
is able to resell it or to pay for a minimum quantity of gas even if it
never takes that minimum quantity.
When courts allow buyers to breach a contract containing a take-orpay provision and only require them to pay the difference between the
market price and the contract price, 103 the buyer's risk has been virtually eliminated. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this flaw in
the holdings of other courts. 104 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
correct amount of damages for breach was the full amount of take-orpay payments that were due under the contract because "[a]ny other
interpretation of the contract is tantamount to rewriting the contract, reallocating the risk in a way not intended by the parties." 105 Some
courts 106 and commentators 107 have made similar suggestions with re101. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236; Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1157. See also McArthur,
supra note 1, at 359; 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 724.5; J. Michael Medina, The
Take-or-Pay Wars: A Cautionary Analysis for the Future, 27 TULSA L.J. 283, 286-87 (1991). See
also infra Part II. A.
102. See McArthur, supra note I, at 359.
103. This is the remedy that the majority of the courts who have been confronted with this
issue have given to the sellers when buyers have breached. See Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.,
863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
104. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237.
105. !d.
106. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to
the great discomfort of their trading partners . . . . Parties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries"). !d. at 1357.
107. See generally Subha Narasinthan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123 (1986); Robert E. Scott, The Case For Market Dam-
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spect to the proper role of the judiciary in terms of allowing parties to
allocate risk in contracts themselves. They have generally suggested
that courts should respect the risk allocation of contracting parties, and
not seek to reallocate risk under the guise of fairness, because the allocation of risk is one of the elements of the contract that is bargained for
by the contracting parties and should be enforced as written in the absence of coercion, fraud or unconscionability. 108 On this same subject,
the Seventh Circuit has stated, "[u]nless pacts are enforced according to
their terms, the institution of contract, with all the advantages private
negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized." 109
However, in Roye Realty, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated,
"[a]lthough we agree that take-or-pay contracts were designed to allocate the risks involved in gas production and marketing, we cannot accede to the view that such allocation of risk is determinative of the
measure of damages. " 110 Thus, even though the Roye Realty court recognized the purpose of the take-or-pay provisions, it took it upon itself
to ignore that purpose and reallocate the risk so that the buyer was
given substantially less risk than it was allocated by the contract. This
alteration makes the contract a substantially better bargain for the
buyer, such that it is highly probable that the buyer would have been
required to pay a higher price for the gas if it had not accepted the allocation of the contractually provided risk during the pre-contract negotiations. As previously stated, courts should not be in the business of
rewriting contracts or reallocating risk provided for therein. Thus, the
Colorado rule is better at preserving the intentions of the contracting
parties, and at preserving their bargained-for allocation of risk.
C. Take-or-Pay Clause is Distinguishable from Liquidated Damages

Provisions
Alternatively a take-or-pay clause could be interpreted as
equivalent to a liquidated damages provision, which is governed by
Section 2-718 of the UCC. 111 However, the Colorado Supreme Court
and the majority of the courts have rejected that interpretation. 112 In
ages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1155 (1990).
108. See generally Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CALL. REv. 1123 (1986); Robert E. Scott, The Case For Market Damages:
Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1155 (1990).
109. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1357.
110. Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150, 1158 (Okl. 1993).
111. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997).
112. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 689 (lOth Cir.
1991); Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Colo. 1993); Roye Re-
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Chemco, the court stated, "[b]ecause the alternative [paying for the gas
without taking it] is a performance obligation, it is distinguishable from
a liquidated damages remedy." 113 This interpretation is valid because
while liquidated damages provisions require the breaching party to pay
a sum that is fixed by the contract upon breach, the alternative contract
requires the payment of a fixed sum regardless of whether there is a
breach of contract by the buyer. 114 Thus, the take-or-pay provision is
not a penalty for breach, but a performance obligation.
Because of this significant difference, courts should not analyze
take-or-pay clauses as liquidated damages provisions. Thus, the reasonableness of the take-or-pay requirement is not an issue for the courts to
examine, whereas reasonableness in light of the anticipated and actual
harm is the core of the analysis with which courts scrutinize liquidated
damages provisions. 115 Furthermore, Official Comment 10 of Section 2718 of the UCC asserts that take-or-pay provisions are not the equivalent of liquidated damages, and it cites the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. 116 in
support of this contention. 117
This universal acceptance of the difference between take-or-pay
provisions and liquidated damages remedies is important because it allows sellers of natural gas to allocate some of the risk of fluctuations in
the market price to the buyers. If take-or-pay provisions were treated as
liquidated damages, then it is likely that the provisions would often be
held unenforceable because they were unreasonably large in the case of
a substantial decline in the market price for gas and, as such, considered to be a penalty. 118 Furthermore, the take-or-pay requirement could
easily be considered unreasonable in light of the anticipated harm if the
buyer breached when there was only a slight decline in the market
price. In that case the only real harm to the seller would be the costs of
finding a new buyer and the slight difference between the market and
contract prices. If the take-or-pay provisions were frequently declared
unenforceable as unreasonable liquidated damages, then the whole risk

alty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
113. Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237.
114. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1991);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987);
Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1237; 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1082 at 463-64 (1964).
115. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997).
116. 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987).
117. See U.C.C. § 2-718, cmt. 10 (1997).
118. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1997). Although this section does not specifically analyze take-orpay provisions, the analysis used in the sub-part of this Note is based on the text of§ 2-718 of the

u.c.c.
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allocation purpose of the take-or-pay clause would be defeated and the
take-or-pay clauses would essentially become meaningless.

D. Chemco Rule Does Not Give Seller Unjust Enrichment Nor Is It
Unconscionable
I. Unjust Enrichment
One potential criticism of Chemco is that it creates an unjust enrichment because the seller is permitted to keep the gas that the buyer
has not taken, and still receive the payments due under the take-or-pay
provision. 119 The elements of unjust enrichment are generally defined as
a benefit conferred by one party that is known to and accepted by the
other party and that such acceptance is inequitable without compensation given to the conferring party. 120 A counter claim of unjust enrichment by a breaching buyer should fail because the buyer has not conferred any benefit on the seller. The only thing that the buyer has done
is breach the contract between it and the seller, which is typically not
considered to be a benefit to the non-breaching party. Additionally, because both parties, having equal bargaining power, 121 negotiated and
contracted for the take-or-pay provision, it is not inequitable for the
seller to receive the full amount of the take-or-pay payments due under
the contract and keep the gas that the buyer does not take. Furthermore,
because the Sections 1-102 and 2-719 of the UCC permit parties to
craft remedies beyond those supplied by other sections of the UCC,
such a remedy is appropriate and permitted by the statutory law of
nearly every state. 122
While it is true that the seller in essence gets the best of both
worlds when it receives money for the gas that the buyer does not take,
this only occurs when the buyer breaches the contract. The buyer
should know its contractual obligations when it signs a contract, and if
it is unwilling to fulfill its obligations thereunder, it should seek to bargain for a more favorable contract. Given that an individual seller is not
likely to control the market price for natural gas, the seller is not forcing the buyer to breach. Furthermore, the buyer is in a position to prevent this gain for the seller by simply performing its obligations under
119. See infra Part II.A.
120. See Midwest Grain Prods., Inc. v. Envirofuels Mktg., Inc., 1998 WL 63077 at *5
(lOth Cir. 1998); Dove Valley Bus. Park Assoc., Ltd. v. Board of County Comms. of Arapahoe
County, 945 P.2d 395, 403 (Colo. 1997); N.C. Corff Partnership, Ltd. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 929
P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
121. See McArthur, supra note 1, at 360.
122. See supra note 30 and Part II.B.
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the contract and paying for the minimum quantity of gas required by
the contract. For these reasons, an unjust enrichment counterclaim by a
breaching buyer should be denied.

2. Unconscionability
The same argument that can be used to support a breaching buyer's
unjust enrichment defense claim can also be used to support a defense
of unconscionability. This claim is stronger than the unjust enrichment
claim, but in practice it has been rejected by courts. 123 Typically, buyers have claimed that the take-or-pay provision was not bargained for
because there was disparate bargaining power between them and the
sellers, making enforcement of the take-or-pay provision unconscionable. 124 Section 2-302 of the UCC allows courts to refuse to enforce
parts of contracts that the court determines are unconscionable. 125 However, courts have generally rejected these claims because pipeline buyers usually draft gas purchase contracts and the buyers have substantial
market and negotiating power 126 which negates the disparate bargaining
power assertion. 127 The lack of success of the unconscionability defense
in courts indicates that it is not likely to be a successful claim for
breaching buyers to use in an effort to reduce the amount of damages
they must pay.

E. Chemco Rule Provides a Deterrence against Future Breaches
Policy considerations also favor the Colorado rule over the majority
rule. One policy basis of contract law is that society is better off when
there is predictability in the performance and enforcement of contracts.128 Although there are economic arguments that support the concept of an efficient breach of contracts, 129 if one ignores those relatively
rare circumstances, and accepts that society as a whole is better off

123. See Brumark Corp. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. C-87-46 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Roger
Mills County 1989); Medina, supra note 29, at 228, citing Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp.,
669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (D. Colo. 1987).
124. See Medina, supra note 28, at 228.
125. See U.C.C. §2-302 (1997). See also Medina, supra note 28, at 228.
126. One commentator has even stated that "(i]t should make a lawyer blush to stand before
a court and argue that a contract negotiated by gas pipeline executives (with the assistance of counsel) contained a clause that was unconscionable at the time it was written." Medina, supra note 28,
at n.42, quoting 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNiFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PRACTITIONER'S EDITION § 7-18, at 33 (Supp. 1991).
127. See id.
128. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1990); R.!CHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, 89-91 (4th ed. 1988).
129. See id. at 94-95.
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when contracts are fully performed, any policy that deters contract
breaches is clearly in the public's best interest.
The Colorado rule imposes harsher penalties than the majority rule
on buyers that breach contracts containing take-or-pay provisions. Under the Colorado rule, breaching buyers must pay the full amount of
take-or-pay payments due under the contract, while the sellers retain
the gas. 130 In contrast, the majority rule allows the buyers to breach and
only pay the difference between the market and contract prices. 131
Clearly, the breaching buyer will always pay less in damages for breach
under the majority rule than under the Colorado rule. As such, the
Colorado rule will create a greater financial deterrent against contract
breaches than the majority rule. For this public policy reason, the Colorado rule is a better rule for society.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the discrepancy between courts' interpretations of the correct
measure of damages for a breach of a take-or-pay provision, a uniform
interpretation needs to be established. 132 While either the majority rule
or the Colorado rule would establish the needed uniformity, the Colorado rule is superior for several important reasons. First, the Colorado
rule preserves the plain wording of the contracts containing take-or-pay
provisions. Second, the Colorado rule preserves the intentions of the
contracting parties, by maintaining their bargained-for risk allocation.
Finally, the Colorado rule establishes a deterrent against future contract
breaches by buyers of natural gas by awarding a higher amount of damages to the non-breaching sellers than they would receive under the
majority rule. Thus, the Colorado rule will provide stability and predictability in the natural gas market.
While the Colorado rule awards a greater amount of damages to the
non-breaching sellers than the majority rule, the breaching buyers are
getting what they bargained for. Fairness is truly in the eye of the beholder, and while the uniform adoption of the Colorado rule may have
a negative impact on pipeline buyers of natural gas, they can always
bargain to pay a higher price to the sellers in exchange for the omission
of a take-or-pay provision, or a reduction in the minimum quantity of
gas that they are required pay for. Courts should not take it upon themselves to rewrite contracts or reallocate the risk that is allocated therein.

130. See Chemco, 854 P.2d at 1236-37.
131. See Roye Realty, 863 P.2d at 1155.
132. This will benefit society. See irifra Part IV.E. It will also satisfy one of the primary
purposes set forth by the U.C.C. See U.C.C. §1-101 (1997).
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Such allocations should be left to the contracting parties when they negotiate and draft the terms of their contracts. The drafting room is the
forum where fairness should be determined, not the courtroom. For the
foregoing reasons, the Colorado rule should be adopted by all of the jurisdictions that encounter cases that have similar facts to those in
Chemco.
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